8 actual or potential conflict situations around the world deteriorated in April, and 3 improved, according to CrisisWatch. Tensions between Georgia and Russia escalated sharply as Russia unilaterally moved additional peacekeepers into the breakaway region Abkhazia 1 May. The government of Zimbabwe launched a brutal countrywide campaign of violence and intimidation and continues to block results of 29 March elections. Burundi saw daily clashes between FNL rebels and the army grow fiercer, killing over 50. The situation also deteriorated in Somalia, Yemen, Haiti, Sri Lanka and Uganda. There was improvement in Nepal, where twice-postponed polls for a Constituent Assembly were successfully held 10 April. In Timor-Leste, rebel leader Gastão Salsinha surrendered 29 April. The situation also improved in Cyprus. For May, Burundi, Georgia and Zimbabwe are identified as Conflict Risk Alerts. Zimbabwe is a Conflict Resolution Opportunity.

The U.S. military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence but has reached the limit of what it can achieve. Without fundamental political changes in Iraq, success will remain fragile and dangerously reversible. Crisis Group issues two companion reports today. The New Sunni Landscape describes the sweeping changes affecting Sunni tribes, al-Qaeda in Iraq and what remains of the insurgency. The Need for a New Political Strategy analyses reasons for the current deadlock and suggests a way forward. Both call for a different approach focusing on pressuring the Iraqi government to agree to political compromise, engaging in negotiations with a fuller range of Iraqi actors, and altering the regional climate.

The U.S. military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence but has reached the limit of what it can achieve. Without fundamental political changes in Iraq, success will remain fragile and dangerously reversible. Crisis Group issues two companion reports today. The New Sunni Landscape describes the sweeping changes affecting Sunni tribes, al-Qaeda in Iraq and what remains of the insurgency. The Need for a New Political Strategy analyses reasons for the current deadlock and suggests a way forward. Both call for a different approach focusing on pressuring the Iraqi government to agree to political compromise, engaging in negotiations with a fuller range of Iraqi actors, and altering the regional climate.

Years of President Álvaro Uribe’s intensive security operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are beginning to produce tangible results. But military gains can only succeed if combined with a robust political strategy that consistently pursues a swap of imprisoned insurgents for hostages in FARC captivity, re-establishes working relations with neighbours along borders and strongly advances integrated rural development to consolidate security and broaden international support. It is crucial to engage Ecuador immediately and Venezuela subsequently to re-establish and strengthen border cooperation and prevent the FARC’s use of sanctuaries.

The caretaker government, along with the international community, must take credible steps to restore democracy to Bangladesh ahead of the December 2008 general elections. Although the caretaker government insists its plans to stamp out corruption and hold general elections by December are on track, its achievements have been patchy. There is an immediate need for dialogue between the government and the main parties. Ideally, a new consensus would not only cover how to hold elections but also develop commitments on post-election behaviour and democratic functioning. International actors should recognise that the priority is to maintain pressure for timely and credible elections.

The international community should refrain from counter-productive intervention in Serbia’s 11 May parliamentary and local elections, including offering to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Public anger over Western support for Kosovo’s independence is such that any attempt by the EU or US to support pro-Western parties prior to the elections risks strengthening the nationalist vote. The election is unlikely to change Belgrade’s policy towards the new state, even in the unlikely event a pro-Western government comes to power. EU leaders should not appease nationalist forces by offering an SAA before Serbia has met the long-standing condition for it: full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.